Much to say about Nothing

21 January 2023

Strategic Competition in Indian Ocean Region

Interdependence. The rivalry between U.S. and China is the next defining phase of international politics. For the way this rivalry will unfold in the future, this interdependence must reduce substantially before any phase of conflict and strategic contention comes around. However, such a situation seems difficult as it has taken them four decades to achieve linkages. It is just not possible to reduce trade volume to a few billions within a few years and a herculean task to shift investment from one country to another, and to close operational industries, businesses, and commercial transactions – they do not even have alternative markets.

Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Alfred Thayer Mahan noted that a state which controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia as this ocean is the key to seven seas. Being a geographical reality, it is important how great powers and regional states see the IOR which is home to around 2.7 billion people, thirty-three states and around 40 percent of the global oil supplies go through the region. For the U.S. it is an extension of its own power matrix while China perceives it as a region having security anxieties. It is imperative to note those trends in this region which add to insecurities that may lead to war, conflicts, and even cooperation. The prevailing security issues of IOR include deteriorating economic indexes, piracy, smuggling, human security violations, pandemics, and weak environment protection.

The US National Security Strategy describes China as a ‘revisionist’ state which threatens the American rules-based international order. If one reads about Thucydides, it becomes clear that revisionist powers have been creating problems for the existing system. Germany, Italy, and Soviet Union were once considered revisionist states. The existing geopolitical discourse is marked by a particular U.S.-created debate about China. Status-quo powers, as they perceive themselves, portray themselves as good and nice and consider revisionists as problem-makers.

From the military point of view, the U.S. military base on the Island of Diego Garcia increases security dilemma for China and Russia. This is why China opened its own military base in Djibouti. A surprising fact is that the U.S., Japan, and even France has military bases in Djibouti. Chinese presence in Djibouti is being perceived as a problem but China does not control Djibouti as portrayed by the West. In 2020, Russia established a new naval base in Sudan for a period of 25 years due to the fear of blocking of strategic choke points. And now, Russia is seen as a revitalized malign actor by the U.S. for its bold steps. China-India competition is another factor, and both are trying to invest in the Duqm port of Oman which is a major gateway in Gulf to the Indian Ocean.

Indian Ambitions. India wants to pursue great power status in international politics in the future. India sees itself as a state which is in a position to have a natural influence in the Indian Ocean – that is exactly how Pakistan sees itself. The Indian Navy, which is the 7th largest navy in the world, is set to increase its strategic presence in IOR through nuclear arsenals and is also interested in exploring deep sea minerals.

Pakistan’s Strategic Choices. In its NSS 2022, the U.S. has stated its five partners – India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Pakistan has been deliberately excluded with India designated as the ‘net security provider’ and offshore balancer vis-à-vis China in the region. Such a situation reflects increasing security concerns for Pakistan. Here looms the pertinent challenge of the peripheralization of Pakistan, especially with the U.S. when Pakistan has deep relations with China. With an intensified China-U.S. conflict, the risk to choose sides also increases for Pakistan. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is clear – Pakistan is not there and is thus being pushed towards China. If Pakistan moves to that direction, it will automatically alienate the U.S. in its foreign policy options which needs to be avoided. Indian military activities in the IOR increase Pakistan’s strategic anxieties. Complete alliance with China will create problems as the U.S. dominates international financial institutions and could create severe economic challenges for Pakistan thereby pushing Pakistan to adopt hedging strategy which stresses how to balance between both big powers without aligning with any one of them, and how the national security policy can be drafted to bring maximum output for political, economic, and military benefits.

13 December 2022

US – China Rivalry and the Russian Factor

Currently the debate is ripe all around the globe in the policy and intelligence circles to make an estimate about the future projection of China in the backdrop of Russian invasion of Ukraine. The million dollar riddle everyone is procastinating to resolve is “Will China go to war with G7 countries? / Will China invade Taiwan in the Russian fashion?”. Indepth comparisons are undertaken at various levels to judge the future move of the Chinese as they are expected to be emboldened by the Russian envasion of Ukraine.

The comaparison of China with Russia is like comparing oranges and apples. One might think otherwise as well seeing so many commanalities in the Russian and Chinese modus oprendi but there are many stark differences as well. In order to wage a war to achieve certain objectives, the primary question in the mind of the leadership is “will we be able to sustain the effort till achievement of the objectives” aka culmination point (before or after the exhaustion of all the resources).

While taking stock of the military hardware, one of the main essential component for sustainance of operations is the logistics in terms of human resource and the means to feed them. In the current times of global inter-dependence, it is quite a challenge for any country to be self sufficient in all domains where some reliance is made on global partners in one aspect or the other. Deep diving into the Russian mechanisms, one thing is clear that Russians are able to feed its own people / military with the home grown food. Russia is not much dependent on the food imports. The 18th and 19th centuray warfare was conducted by creating a pool of human resource from allies due to shortage of war fighting aged male citizens of own military. This cemented the concept of coalition building to respond to crisis situations among various nation states. Russia has a very robust mechanism of conscription, reservaists, ultra-right wing nationalist etc who are ready to be pooled in to the main stream military service at a very short notice reducing Russia’s dependance on foreign human resource for military service in the war. Russia’s ability to sustain a major war beyond 9 months is a clear manifestation of its stamina in terms of human resource and food.

Chinese meteoric rise to the (nearly) top of the food chain in the economic domain in the past couple of decades has brought along subtle changes in the way Chinese operate in the 21st century. Poverty ridden Chinese population in the 19th century was contended with the meagre food that was grown by themselves due to lack of resources to import from abroad. Globalisation and additional disposable income has gradually moved the Chinese society to be more dependant on the imports specially for the proteins. The Chinese animals are required to be fed with maze and wheat which is imported rather than home grown. Wars are fought by ‘Expandable soldiers’ as war is a highly casuality intensive interaction. Chinese policy of one child for many decades has produced families with a single child only who is extremely dear to the parents unlike older generations where out of 3-4 children on average in a family would not be devastated incase of loss of one or two children in war fighting. The current Chinese society is extremely averse to casuality. This was clearly visible in the aftermath of China-Ladakh incident where Indian soldiers’ funerals were given nation wide coverage on the TV channels in comparison to the four chinese soldiers’ funerals televised after 7 months in a perfectly articulated recorded event. During any future war, the casualities are expected to be very high and the Chinese Govt will not get as much time for orchestrating funerals thereby creating ripples in the already casuality sensitive population thus reducing pulic support fracturing the Claustwitzian Trinity.

Geo-political compulsions are taking both sides of the competition to the abe of brinksmanship where ‘Rule Based Order’ is being supplementated by “Free and Open Indo Pacific” in the absence of an alternative narrative. Lack of security cooperation framework in the Asia Pacific like NATO is creating opportunities for antagonists such as DPRK to increase their leverage by investing heavily in the military domain creating a snowball effect heading in the direction of a potential arms race in the coming decade. ‘Will China go the military way?” in the near (or far future) will be highly consequential for the region. Following the Russian path is not an option for China due to its inter-dependance on the west (particularly the US).

13 April 2022

What are the implications for Pakistan’s Pivot to Geo-Economics

At the end of the Cold War, the third largest nuclear power on earth was not Britain, France or China. It was Ukraine inheriting roughly 5,000 nuclear arms. Looking for better economic conditions, Ukraine returned all of its nuclear warheads to Russia in exchange for economic aid and security assurances from US, UK in a bid to pivot from Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics. The removal of this arsenal often gets hailed as a triumph of arms control. Diplomats and peace activists cast Ukraine as a model citizen in a world of would-be nuclear powers. But the deadly weapons, some argued, were the only reliable means of deterring Russian aggression. More widely, experts fear that the ongoing Russian ‘Special Operations’ could turn Ukraine from an example of arms-control benefits to one of atomic-disarmament risks, and drive the aspiring nuclear states of the world to pursue their own nuclear arms programs.

In the current backdrop, Pakistan’s policy shift from Geo-Politics to GeoEconomics is bringing many optimists back to the drawing board. As it is clearly seen that the world politics is in a state of flux and going through patches of relatively uneasy peace between numerous contenders in the great power competition. Unipolarity is currently under stress where regional power contestation is taking different shapes. United States as a receding power is endeavouring to regain lost glory though it is being challenged at multiple fronts by rising China and resurgent Russia. Political re-alignments are in the offering to the regional players who have been fence sitters for a considerable time. US withdrawal from Afghanistan and shift of focus to Indo-Pacific clearly indicates future power contestation in this region. On the other hand Russia is flexing her muscle by creating a new ‘New World Order’ by defying all West backed sanctions and exert influence in the periphery thus radiating renewed self-confidence as well as providing fillip for new alignments.

The geo-strategic location of Pakistan places it right in the centre of three major security complexes of the world thus at the epicentre of the Geo-Politics creating both challenges as well as opportunities for Pakistan due to geography, demography and potential size of economy casting it to be a prudent candidate for the status of a Geo-Strategic pivot state. However, the Achilles' heel for Pakistan is its economy. Despite economic growth of 5.3% in 2020–21, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the foundations of Pakistan’s economy are beset by macroeconomic weaknesses, underdevelopment and interrelated policy failures. The newly published National Security Policy emphasis on prosperity as a means to greater strategic ends implies no substitution of Geo-Strategy for Geo-Economics: instead the latter folds into the former. As a result, while the document enunciates that Pakistan wants ‘regional peace’ and to ‘improve relationship with India’, that goal is in effect subordinate to a stronger defence and deterrence stance, made possible by the anticipated stronger economy placing Pakistan further in the “Guns versus butter’ conundrum.

Pakistan’s sole focus for Geo-Economics is on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the ambit of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which might be scuttled by the poor infrastructure development and logistics bottle-necks due to slow border clearance procedures and abysmal rail-road connectivity with neighbouring countries. With the not so transparent contracts with the Chinese companies for Energy and infrastructure development, it is difficult to assess the long-term viability and dividends produced by these mega projects to re-pay loans to the Chinese lenders. Sri Lanka declaring bankruptcy must give Pakistani economic pundits food for thought to re-calibrate policy option for shift from Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics. Given current trends, with no political step change with India seeming likely, the new policy creates the prospect of greater, rather than less, GeoStrategic competition with India. Good intentions aside, Pakistan’s pivot toward GeoEconomics is likely to hit a brick wall of reality—and fast.