Currently the debate is ripe all around the globe in the policy and intelligence circles to make an estimate about the future projection of China in the backdrop of Russian invasion of Ukraine. The million dollar riddle everyone is procastinating to resolve is “Will China go to war with G7 countries? / Will China invade Taiwan in the Russian fashion?”. Indepth comparisons are undertaken at various levels to judge the future move of the Chinese as they are expected to be emboldened by the Russian envasion of Ukraine.
The comaparison of China with Russia is like comparing oranges and apples. One might think otherwise as well seeing so many commanalities in the Russian and Chinese modus oprendi but there are many stark differences as well. In order to wage a war to achieve certain objectives, the primary question in the mind of the leadership is “will we be able to sustain the effort till achievement of the objectives” aka culmination point (before or after the exhaustion of all the resources).
While taking stock of the military hardware, one of the main essential component for sustainance of operations is the logistics in terms of human resource and the means to feed them. In the current times of global inter-dependence, it is quite a challenge for any country to be self sufficient in all domains where some reliance is made on global partners in one aspect or the other. Deep diving into the Russian mechanisms, one thing is clear that Russians are able to feed its own people / military with the home grown food. Russia is not much dependent on the food imports. The 18th and 19th centuray warfare was conducted by creating a pool of human resource from allies due to shortage of war fighting aged male citizens of own military. This cemented the concept of coalition building to respond to crisis situations among various nation states. Russia has a very robust mechanism of conscription, reservaists, ultra-right wing nationalist etc who are ready to be pooled in to the main stream military service at a very short notice reducing Russia’s dependance on foreign human resource for military service in the war. Russia’s ability to sustain a major war beyond 9 months is a clear manifestation of its stamina in terms of human resource and food.
Chinese meteoric rise to the (nearly) top of the food chain in the economic domain in the past couple of decades has brought along subtle changes in the way Chinese operate in the 21st century. Poverty ridden Chinese population in the 19th century was contended with the meagre food that was grown by themselves due to lack of resources to import from abroad. Globalisation and additional disposable income has gradually moved the Chinese society to be more dependant on the imports specially for the proteins. The Chinese animals are required to be fed with maze and wheat which is imported rather than home grown. Wars are fought by ‘Expandable soldiers’ as war is a highly casuality intensive interaction. Chinese policy of one child for many decades has produced families with a single child only who is extremely dear to the parents unlike older generations where out of 3-4 children on average in a family would not be devastated incase of loss of one or two children in war fighting. The current Chinese society is extremely averse to casuality. This was clearly visible in the aftermath of China-Ladakh incident where Indian soldiers’ funerals were given nation wide coverage on the TV channels in comparison to the four chinese soldiers’ funerals televised after 7 months in a perfectly articulated recorded event. During any future war, the casualities are expected to be very high and the Chinese Govt will not get as much time for orchestrating funerals thereby creating ripples in the already casuality sensitive population thus reducing pulic support fracturing the Claustwitzian Trinity.
Geo-political compulsions are taking both sides of the competition to the abe of brinksmanship where ‘Rule Based Order’ is being supplementated by “Free and Open Indo Pacific” in the absence of an alternative narrative. Lack of security cooperation framework in the Asia Pacific like NATO is creating opportunities for antagonists such as DPRK to increase their leverage by investing heavily in the military domain creating a snowball effect heading in the direction of a potential arms race in the coming decade. ‘Will China go the military way?” in the near (or far future) will be highly consequential for the region. Following the Russian path is not an option for China due to its inter-dependance on the west (particularly the US).
